This document analyses real-time revisions in output gap estimates published by the European Commission for 15 countries over the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013][2014]. We fi nd that output gap revisions (both in levels and changes) are mainly driven by GDP growth forecast errors. Also, output gap revisions have opposite signs across expansions and recessions: real-time output gaps are downward biased (smaller than the fi nal estimates) during expansions and upward biased (higher than the fi nal estimates) in recessions. Our fi ndings may have relevant implications for the conduct and assessment of fi scal policy in real time. For instance, according to our results, real-time estimates of the structural balance would be upward biased in expansions and downward biased in recessions. This implies that the fi scal stance of an economy estimated in real time would be excessively expansionary in recessions as compared to the fi nal estimate.
Introduction
The output gap is the extent to which the level of aggregate economic activity exceeds (or falls short of) the economy's productive capacity, i.e. the gap between actual and potential output. The importance of this concept for policy analysis is obvious. Both levels and changes of output gaps can play an important role in the conduct of monetary policy as an indication of infl ationary pressures. In addition, the output gap is a crucial ingredient in the calculation of cyclically adjusted budget balances and, therefore, of the measure of the fi scal stance and the underlying fi scal situation of countries. This importance has even increased since fi scal rules, in particular in Europe, assess the fi scal situation of countries based on this indicator.
Nevertheless, the output gap is an unobserved variable that needs to be estimated.
Currently, there are several techniques for estimating an economy's potential output growth and, therefore, its output gap. However, it is very often the case that these methods provide different results. Moreover, there is also evidence that, irrespective of the method, the output gap estimates formulated on the basis of current information (so-called real-time estimates) are revised over time, which casts doubt on their usefulness for policy-making.
In this regard, not only the magnitude of the revisions to estimated output gaps but also the causes behind these revisions are relevant. First, the revisions might be due to changes in underlying data, i.e. real GDP growth initial estimates by National Statistical Offi ces, which are to some extent inevitable. Second, since estimates of the output gap in a given period depend on the expected economic outlook for the future (which conditions both the expected growth outlook and the estimates of potential output growth of the economy), insofar as these expectations (forecast) are not confi rmed, they will affect the assessment of the cyclical situation not only of the future but of the past as well.
1 Finally, revisions of output gaps estimated in real time might be due to changes in the modelling techniques employed, which could be based on new theoretical or empirical fi ndings regarding the economy under consideration. are smaller on average than fi nal estimates); 3) the revisions of output gaps are higher at cyclical turning points; 4) data revisions do not play a major role in the revisions of output gaps; 5) revisions seem to be more related to projected actual GDP numbers than to potential GDP, and the former are related to macroeconomic projections. These empirical regularities are of course important for policy analysis. In particular, in the case of the implications for fi scal policy, on which this paper focuses, if a negative bias on real-time output gaps is confi rmed, this would imply that structural fi scal balances estimated in real time would on average be overestimated (and structural fi scal defi cits underestimated), thus providing an optimistic view of the underlying fi scal position of countries. On the contrary, if this bias depends on the sign of the initial estimates as previously mentioned, structural fi scal balances would be overestimated in good times and underestimated in bad times, thus providing an assessment in real time that could lead to a procyclical fi scal policy. Also, the fi scal stance of the economy (measured by the change in the structural balance) might suffer from the same type of shortcomings.
Moreover, if revisions in output gap estimates are mainly due to actual output forecast errors, this would make the concept of potential output less subject to criticism, or at least this criticism would have to be extended to macroeconomic projections in general. This result would also have practical implications for the current discussion on fi scal rules in Europe. In particular, it is often justifi ed that the lack of reliability of output gap estimates should lead to less weight being attributed to the concept of structural balances in respect of the fi scal rules that could be substituted for an expenditure rule in which the ceiling on public expenditure growth would be linked to the evolution of (past and future) GDP growth. Inasmuch as macroeconomic projections are the main drivers of signifi cant revisions, this would not avoid the problem of introducing biases into the analysis of fi scal policy.
In this context, we revisit in this paper the question of how signifi cant real-time output gap revisions are. In particular, we concentrate on the estimates prepared by the European Commission, since these are the relevant ones in terms of the implementation of the Stability 3 Descriptive evidence of the revision of output gaps in levels and changes
Our main object of interest throughout the paper is the real-time revision of the output gap in year t (REV t OG ), which is defi ned as:
where OG t F refers to the fi nal estimate of the output gap in year t, namely, that of Spring 2015;
on the other hand, OG t RT represents the real-time estimate of the output gap in year t, made in Spring of t-1.
We fi rst present some descriptive plots of the real-time revisions of the output gap This means that, during economic expansions, real-time estimates of structural defi cits could lead to an overly benign assessment of the underlying fi scal situation of countries, while the opposite is true under recessions. According to this pattern, the systematic correction proposed by Kempkes (2014) would generate overly large structural defi cits in recession periods. Indeed, this type of correction, if any, should be contingent on the degree of slack in the economy.
In addition to real-time revisions in output gaps, we also explore revisions in their changes. This is also relevant since the fi scal stance is often defi ned as a monotonic function of the change in the output gap. In the event that consecutive revisions of the output gap cancel one another, this would lead to a limited revision of the year-by-year change in the fi nal estimates of the output gaps and therefore of the fi scal stance. Chart 3 shows that this is not confi rmed by data. Revisions of realtime estimates of changes in output gaps are also sizeable and of an opposite sign if we distinguish between expansions and recessions. This pattern prevails in all the fi fteen countries in our sample.
In the case of Spain, the revisions during expansions increase to around 4 p.p., while the magnitude in recession periods is -2 p.p. These average revisions would imply signifi cant revisions in the fi scal stance of the Spanish economy. In particular, according to real-time estimates, fi scal policy in Spain was assessed to be making a much heavier structural adjustment in the expansionary period (around a 2 p.p. higher effort estimated in real time on average than the corresponding fi nal estimation), whereas during the crisis fi scal policy was assessed in real time to be making a much lower structural adjustment than the one estimated with fi nal data (around a 1 p.p. lower effort on average). We now turn to the analysis of GDP growth revisions in more detail. We decompose the overall revision in GDP growth into two components, namely, forecast errors and data revisions. To be more specifi c, we consider the following decomposition of the revision in GDP where superscripts refer to the year in which the GDP growth chart is released. We implicitly assume that the fi rst data release takes place at t+1 so that any revision between t+1 and T is assumed to be caused by ex-post data revisions. In contrast, any revision between the forecast publication at t-1 and the data release at t+1 is assumed to be entirely due to forecast errors. If We can also see in Chart 7 and 8 that movements in the output gap revisions are strongly correlated with movements in the updates of GDP growth in all countries. However, this correlation vanishes when we consider revisions in potential growth estimates. Indeed, a regression of the three factors confi rms that revisions in GDP growth are able to explain around 40% of the change in output gap revisions and its associated coeffi cient is signifi cant, while the coeffi cient on potential growth revisions is not signifi cant and the corresponding R2 falls from 40% to 2%.
REAL AND POTENTIAL GROWTH REVISIONS
SOURCE: European Commission. 
SOURCES OF REAL GROWTH REVISIONS
This decomposition allows us to quantify the contributions of historical real-time revisions in GDP and potential growth together with the initial output gap revisions. In addition, we can also decompose the revisions in actual GDP growth into data revisions and forecast errors as described above. To be more specifi c, we use this decomposition for the case of Spain in Chart 9 to confi rm that forecast errors (brown bar) are the main driver of the magnitude and the symmetric behavior of revisions in output gaps (blue line). Note also that the residual (yellow bar)
includes not only the initial revision in the output gap -2004 in our data -but also the numerical error due to the logarithmic approximation of the decomposition.
SOURCE: European Commission. The previous decomposition also illustrates the trade-off between a more procyclical potential growth methodology, which implies smaller revisions in the output gap (as the revision in potential would compensate the revisions in real growth), and a less procyclical potential growth estimate, which implies larger revisions in the output gap (as no revisions in potential imply that all revisions in real growth would be translated to output gap revisions).
5 Concluding Remarks
We have analysed the size and the cyclical behavior of revisions of the output gap in levels and changes. In doing so, we have isolated the role of real-time GDP growth forecasts errors, data updates and changes in the estimation of potential output. We consider as real-time the estimate for the year t made at Spring of t-1. This defi nition of real time is relevant within several fi scal rules such as those used in the Excessive Defi cit Procedure of the European Union.
Similarly to Orphanides and van Norden (2002), we fi nd sizable revisions on the levels of the output gap. Those revisions also affect the estimated changes in the output gap. Moreover, we fi nd that revisions in output gap levels are primarily due to macroeconomic forecasting errors, while data updates play a minor role.
We also observe that the output gap revisions (and revisions to the changes in output gaps) are of an opposite sign if we distinguish between expansions and recessions. This asymmetry is mainly due to asymmetric forecasting errors: GDP forecasts tend to be prudent in expansions while they prove to be optimistic during recessions.
According to this pattern, while the over-estimation of structural balances advocated by Kempkes (2014) holds during expansions, it turns to under-estimation during recessions.
Moreover, compared to the real-time estimate, the fi nal estimate of the fi scal stance of an economy (measured by the change in the structural balance) would be more expansionary in good times and more contractionary in recessions. Therefore, the type of corrections to realtime estimates of the structural balance suggested by Kempkes (2014) should be contingent on the degree of slack in the economy.
Turning to real time revisions in potential growth fi gures, we fi nd that they are not only smaller than those of actual GDP, but also symmetric across expansion and recession (i.e. real time potential growth estimates are always larger than the fi nal estimates regardless of the cycle). These two characteristics could make potential growth more suitable than actual GDP growth for the design of fi scal rules based on ceilings on public expenditures. 
Appendix
In order to illustrate the trade-off between pro-cyclicality of potential growth and ex-post revisions in output gaps, the next three charts (Chart 10 to 12) plot the revisions in output gaps emerging from three different Hodrick Prescott-based estimates of potential growth (given the EC data on observed GDP growth).
The fi rst is based on the traditional choice lambda=6.25 and produces revisions of a similar magnitude to those of the EC potential growth estimates. The second plots results from the choice lambda=0.001, which basically amounts to a potential growth equal to the real GDP growth (i.e. a fully procyclical estimate of potential). In this case the revisions are much smaller as potential growth revisions fully compensate revisions in real GDP growth -in the extreme case of potential equal to observed growth, the revisions are always zero. Finally, the third chart illustrates the case of constant potential growth, which generates the largest revisions in output gaps because potential growth never compensates revisions in real growth.
Note also that in all three cases, revisions in output gaps are asymmetric across expansions/recessions as they are mainly driven by the observed and asymmetric revisions in GDP growth as illustrated above. 
